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DOES WITHDRAWING LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT CAUSE DEATH OR ALLOW THE 
PATIENT TO DIE? 
ANDREW MCGEE 
Health Law Research Centre, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, 
Brisbane, Queensland 4001, Australia 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses recent arguments of Franklin Miller and Robert Truog about withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment and causation. The authors argue that traditional medical ethics, and the law, are 
mistaken to take the view that withdrawal merely allows the patient to die, rather than causing the 
patient’s death, describing such a view as ‘patently false’. They argue that the law’s continued 
position to the contrary stems from a moral bias, resulting in the moral and legal fiction that 
withdrawal does not cause death but lets the patient die. In so arguing, Miller and Truog join a long 
line of academic criticism of the law that extends back to the seminal decision of Airedale NHS Trust 
v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL) and beyond. In this paper, I take issue with these claims. I argue that 
there are reasonable grounds upon which traditional medical ethics and the law can regard withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment as allowing the patient to die rather than causing death, and so the authors’ 
claims that such a view is patently false cannot be sustained. I then tease out the implications of my 
conclusions for the authors’ claim that there is not such a great distinction between withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, euthanasia and assisted dying. I conclude by discussing some possible objections 
to my own view. 
Keywords: acts, causing death, euthanasia, killing, letting die, omissions, pacemaker. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In their recent book Death, Dying and Organ Transplantation, and in numerous recent articles co-
authored with Dan Brock and Seema Shah, Franklin Miller and Robert Truog1 have criticized the 
traditional view in medical ethics, and in the law, that withdrawal of life sustaining treatment (LST) is 
logically akin to withholding the treatment in the first place.2 The traditional view is that, in both 
                                                            
 Correspondence: Dr A. McGee Health Law Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology, Faculty 
of Law, C Block, 2 George St,  Brisbane, Queensland 4001, Australia. Email a.mcgee@qut.edu.au 
1 I will hereafter refer to Miller and Truog as ‘the authors’. When referring to pieces in which Brock or Shah are 
co-authors, I will still refer to them collectively as ‘the authors’. It will be apparent that the reference is inclusive 
of these other authors from the papers cited in the text or notes.  
2 F Miller and R Truog, Death, Dying and Organ Transplantation (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012); F 
Miller, R Truog and D Brock, ‘Moral Fictions and Medical Ethics’ (2010) 23(9) Bioethics 453; S Shah, R Truog 
and F Miller, ‘Death and Legal Fictions’ (2011) 37(12) Journal of Medical Ethics 719. 
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withholding and withdrawal, the doctors do not cause the patient’s death. Rather, the patient dies from 
his or her underlying condition.3 The authors concede that the traditional ethical and legal position in 
respect of withholding LST is correct in that withholding LST is an omission and so does not cause 
death.4 The patient, they concede, merely dies from their underlying condition.5 However, they 
contend that the same analysis cannot apply to withdrawing LST because acts are involved. For 
example, withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) requires the medical practitioner to 
remove a nasogastric tube, and withdrawing ventilation requires the practitioner to switch off a 
ventilator. Both courses of conduct involve acts which clearly have causal consequences. For this 
reason, they conclude, withdrawal causes death and so is more akin to euthanasia6 than it is to 
withholding LST.7 Indeed, they contend, this is so patently obvious that it requires some explanation 
of how the law and traditional medical ethics could have maintained the opposite view. Their 
explanation is that the law and medical ethics are committed to the belief that it is wrong to kill, 
which they identify as a ‘moral bias’,8 and so it has adopted what they call a moral and legal fiction to 
maintain this position.9 A moral and legal fiction is a false statement which is nonetheless held to be 
true in order to generate a specific moral or legal consequence. For example, it is patently false that a 
corporation is a living person. But in order to generate certain legal consequences, the law has treated 
corporations as if they were living persons. Similarly, so the argument goes, it is patently false that 
withdrawal of LST does not cause death, so the law has adopted the legal fiction that withdrawal of 
LST does not cause death in order to generate the legal consequence that doctors not be liable for 
murder and not be regarded as killers.10 The former kind of legal fiction, where the corporation is 
treated as if it were a person, is transparent. The latter kind, by contrast, is what they call an 
‘unacknowledged’ legal fiction.11 The authors’ task is to expose the legal fiction and try to get us to 
acknowledge it for what it is. Once that is done, the way is open to abandon the fiction, and, in 
particular, to revise the norm that traditional medical ethics and the law cleave to, namely, the norm 
that it is always wrong to cause a person’s death.  
In this paper, I will challenge the authors’ claim that withdrawal of LST causes death. My focus will 
be exclusively on this claim. I will not examine the authors’ claim that the traditional view to the 
contrary takes the form of a moral and legal fiction. That is a further and arguably more controversial 
claim, and it is not necessary for me to expose that particular claim to detailed critical scrutiny if I can 
show that the more fundamental claim on which it is based – that it is patently false to hold that 
withdrawal of LST does not cause death – is not sustainable. For if that claim is not sustainable, then 
                                                            
3 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL). There are, however, some ethicists who might be described 
as traditional in their stance but who would not endorse this view, and who criticize the law as developed in 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL). See the trenchant criticisms of Bland by J Finnis, 
‘Intentionally Killing the “Permanently Unconscious” in J Finnis (ed), Intention and Identity: Collected Essays, 
vol 2 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011) Ch 19, and J Keown, The Law and Ethics of Medicine (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2012) Ch 12. I do not have the space to discuss those views in this paper. 
4 Miller and Truog, n 2, 26. 
5 Ibid.   
6 The term ‘euthanasia’ is used by the authors, and will be used by myself, in line with its legal use to refer only 
to the active termination of a patient’s life, eg, via a lethal injection or other lethal poison. Some ethicists use the 
term in a broader sense to include withholding and withdrawing LST, a use that is captured by the term ‘passive 
euthanasia’. Arguably, such a use begs the question of whether these practices should really be understood as 
species of euthanasia at all, but I do not have the space to argue this point here, beyond the considerations that I 
will discuss below in section I(D) and section II.  
7 Miller and Truog, n 2, 27. 
8 Ibid 3. 
9 Miller, Truog and Brock, n 2. 
10 Ibid 454ff. 
11 Shah, Miller and Truog, n 2, 720. 
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the further categorisation of the falsehood as a moral and legal fiction will itself be rebutted anyway, 
without the need to analyse the concept of a moral and legal fiction and assess the suitability of that 
concept as an analysis of the putative falsehood in question. Section I tackles the claim that 
withdrawal is unlike withholding, and is clearly the cause of death. Section II then takes up two 
possible difficulties for my own account.  
Before turning to these issues, three important preliminary issues must be addressed. First, the authors 
do not challenge the view that withholding, as opposed to withdrawing, LST does not cause death. 
Indeed they state that withholding does not cause death in cases where there is no duty to treat: 
If there is no duty to treat, withholding life-sustaining medical treatment (LST) does not cause 
a patient’s death; the attending clinicians stand by and the patient is allowed to die from the 
progression of a terminal condition.12 
This view about withholding is, however, controversial.  It might be argued that withholding causes 
death13 and that the question of causation is a logically independent question from that of whether a 
duty to treat exists. Why should the duty question settle the question of causation? And where, in any 
event, should the line be drawn between the cases where a duty is held to exist and those where it is 
held not to? A fulsome discussion of these issues is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.14 Since 
Miller and Truog do not question the view about withholding, I will assume for the sake of argument 
that they are correct and will focus solely on their claims about withdrawal, and their criticisms of the 
law’s position on this particular issue. 
The second issue concerns the importance of the authors’ criticisms, and the correlative need for a 
response. Why does it matter if the law adopts a moral and legal fiction with respect to causation and 
withdrawal of LST? It matters because, as the authors themselves point out, if their view is correct, it 
would be better simply to acknowledge that, at bottom, the law and medical ethics regard some 
instances of killing to be morally and legally acceptable.15 If their view is correct, that might have 
significant implications for current debates about whether to legalise euthanasia and assisted dying. 
For if, in essence, killing is already being sanctioned by the law and traditional medical ethics, the 
view that the law is incoherent in continuing to prohibit euthanasia and assisted dying becomes a 
much more compelling view. In this respect, the authors join a long tradition of criticism in which, 
indeed, the law has been declared to be incoherent or, in a famous phrase, ‘intellectually and morally 
misshapen’.16 As John Coggon has recently put it, in the context of the euthanasia and assisted dying 
debates:  
                                                            
12 Miller and Truog, n 2, 26. 
13 See, for instance, J Harris, ‘Bad Samaritans Cause Harm’ (1982) 32 The Philosophical Quarterly 60. 
14  I have ventured such a discussion elsewhere. See A McGee, ‘Ending the Life of the Act/Omission Dispute: 
Causation in Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Measures’ (2011) 31 LS 467, and A McGee, 
‘Omissions, Causation and Responsibility’ (2011) 8 Bioethical Inquiry 351.  
15 Miller and Truog, n 2, vii-viii. 
16 See the judgement of Lord Mustill in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL), 887, 898. See also, 
among others, J Finnis, ‘Crossing the Rubicon’ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 329, (updated in Finnis, n 3, 
Ch 19); J Keown, ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland’ (1997) LQR 113 (updated in 
J Keown, n 3, Ch 12); R Huxtable, Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: from Conflict to Compromise (Abingdon: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 117, 120, 125; M Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its 
Implication for Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 27; R Magnusson, ‘The Future of the 
Euthanasia Debate in Australia’ (1996) 20 (4) Melb Univ L Rev 1108, 1118. The criticism extends back to the 
1970s and the work of James Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’ (1975) 292 New Eng J Med 78. It should 
be emphasised that not all these authors conclude that euthanasia and assisted dying should therefore be 
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In fact, the one thing on which almost everyone seems to be agreed is that the current law is a 
mess.17 
If the view that the current law (and traditional medical ethics) is ‘a mess’ can be shown to be wrong 
– at least on the grounds commonly advanced in support of that view, including by the authors – then 
we can make progress in these debates.  We can show that, whatever other arguments there may be 
for the view that euthanasia and assisted dying should be made lawful, the argument that the law and 
traditional medical ethics effectively already sanction these practices, and so are currently incoherent 
or ‘a mess’, should not be included among them. We thereby make progress in these debates.18  
The third issue is this. The following arguments turn on the application of the act/omission distinction 
and the relationship of these concepts to the concept of causation in the context of ending life – to the 
distinction between killing (causing death)19 and letting die. This is because Miller and Truog 
themselves make much use of the act/omission distinction and the killing/letting die distinction20 in 
their analysis and do not seek to question the moral relevance of these distinctions. But many 
philosophers and legal critics have argued that the act/omission distinction is a red herring 
altogether.21 Rather than obsess over whether a piece of conduct is an act or an omission, we should 
instead focus on the question of whether the conduct in question (here, the withdrawal of LST) is 
justified in the circumstances.22 Similarly, philosophers have notoriously questioned the moral 
relevance of the narrower distinction between killing (causing death) and letting die. Again, rather 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
rendered lawful, of course. Finnis and Keown, for example, argue that moral and intellectual shape to the law 
can be restored without sanctioning these practices. I have no space to consider that alternative view in this 
paper. For discussion of those views, see A McGee, ‘Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: 
Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia’ (2005) Med Law Rev 357 and A McGee, ‘Defending the 
Sanctity of Life Principle: A Reply to John Keown’ (2011) 18 J Law Med 820. 
17 J Coggon, ‘The Wonder of Euthanasia’ (2012) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqs030. 
18 I intend to express no view, either for or against, euthanasia or assisted dying in this paper. My criticisms of 
the arguments of Miller and Truog do not commit me to a position on whether other grounds could be advanced 
in favour of either euthanasia or assisted suicide, but only to the view that the arguments they themselves 
advance on causation cannot be used successfully to mount an argument in favour of euthanasia or assisted 
suicide. My objective in writing this paper is to defend the current legal position against the charge of adopting a 
patently false position in respect of withdrawal and causation, and to contribute to the debate on euthanasia and 
assisted dying only to the extent that this issue is relevant to that debate. 
19 The law defines killing as ‘causing death’ in all common law jurisdictions and in criminal statutes. See, for 
England and Wales, Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) (No 1) [2001] Fam 147, p. 199-
200, 214-215; for the US, see Knutson v The State (1987) 736 P.2d 775; Commonwealth v O’Laughlin (2006) 
446 Mass. 188; Knight v State (1996) 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 5538. In Queensland, see Criminal Code 1899 s 
293. I will therefore use ‘causing death’ and ‘killing’ interchangeably. Aside from noting that ‘killing’, unlike 
‘causing death’, can connote the wrongful taking of life (n 2, p. 3), Miller and Truog also use ‘causing death’ 
and ‘killing’ interchangeably.  
20 An important note of clarification is in order here. Omissions are normally contrasted with acts yet both 
omissions and acts can be forms of allowing things to happen (I can allow the cat out of the gate by opening it, 
or allow the room to cool down by turning off the heating). Although it is controversial to classify withdrawing 
LST as letting die, it is at least an arguable point. By contrast, if we accept that withdrawing LST is an act, and 
accept that omissions are contrasted with acts, it seems to follow logically that withdrawal of LST cannot be an 
omission, even if it could be allowing to die. For reasons we shall see in section I, the issue of whether 
withdrawal of LST is an omission or an act is not as straightforward as these remarks assume. However, in spite 
of the claims I will make in section II, we should in my view understand the law’s classification of withdrawing 
LST as an omission to mean that withdrawal of LST is a species of letting die rather than a species of killing. 
For more detailed discussion, see A McGee, ‘Acting to Let Someone Die’ Bioethics (forthcoming). 
21 For two of many examples, see Andrew Ashworth, ‘The scope of liability for omissions’ (1989) 105 LQR 424 
at 437; R Magnusson, ‘The Future of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia’ (1996) 20 (4) Melb Univ L Rev 1108, 
1118. 
22 See especially Magnusson, ibid. 
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than obsess over the question of whether withdrawal of LST is letting die or killing, it might be 
thought better to bypass these seemingly sterile questions and simply ask whether withdrawing LST – 
or a lethal injection – is justified in the circumstances or not.  
Because Miller and Truog do not take this approach, I will not discuss this alternative approach in this 
paper. My intention is only to assess the cogency or otherwise of the claims Miller and Truog actually 
make in their work. The argument of Miller and Truog is not that the distinction between killing and 
letting die (or the more general act/omission distinction)23 has no moral relevance or is otherwise 
beside the point, but rather that withdrawing LST is a species of killing rather than letting die – 
because acts are involved and because acts cause death (and so kill) rather than let die. Their claim is 
that the law and traditional medical ethics wrongly classify withdrawal of LST as letting die when in 
fact it is killing. On this basis, they mount an argument that the law and traditional medical ethics 
cannot draw such a sharp conceptual line between withdrawing LST and euthanasia. But all these 
claims make use of the act/omission and killing/letting die distinctions, rather than eschewing them as 
irrelevant or as red herrings. True, one might also question whether the killing/letting die distinction 
itself has any moral relevance even if we accepted that withdrawal of LST is letting die rather than 
killing. A person who took that view could then argue that if the distinction has no moral relevance, it 
should have no legal relevance either and we should instead focus on whether withdrawal of LST – or 
a lethal injection – are justified in the circumstances.24 Such a claim is, however, controversial and, 
since it is not necessary for me to discuss such a far reaching claim here in order to assess the 
arguments of Miller and Truog, I will not discuss it. 
With these preliminary issues clarified, let us now turn to the authors’ substantive arguments. 
I.  WITHDRAWING LST AND CAUSATION 
A. The Authors’ Claims 
In accordance with their acceptance of the distinction between causing death and allowing to die, the 
authors concede that, in the absence of any duty to provide life-sustaining treatment, withholding life-
sustaining treatment does not cause death. However, the authors insist that withdrawal is different 
from withholding and that, in withdrawal, a doctor does cause death: 
Whereas withholding mechanical ventilation from a patient who has refused it merely allows 
the patient to die, this is not true of the act of turning off the ventilator.25 
In their paper with Dan Brock, they develop the following example to illustrate their claim. Imagine 
the case of John and Sam, two motorcycle enthusiasts.26 At age 50, they both have separate accidents 
leaving them on a ventilator to breathe.  Two years later, at age 52, John remains on a ventilator, but 
                                                            
23 On the relationship between the act/omission distinction and the killing/letting die distinction, see note 21. A 
separate controversy again concerns exactly what counts as an omission. Again, Miller and Truog do not enter 
into this controversy and, for reasons of space, I must leave it aside in this paper. For discussion, see McGee, 
‘Omissions, Causation and Responsibility’, n 14. 
24 It is worth noting that, in a sense, if, as Truog and Miller argue, withdrawing LST is killing rather than letting 
die then, unless there are other morally relevant differences between them, it does seem to follow that there is no 
morally relevant distinction between withdrawal of LST and what would be other forms of killing on such a 
view – for they would all be forms of killing. But that claim is altogether a different claim from the much more 
general claim that the killing/letting die distinction as such has no moral relevance and that these categories 
should be dropped entirely in moral and legal discussion. 
25 Miller and Truog, n 2, 5-6. 
26 Miller, Truog and Brock, n 2, 453. 
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Sam has been weaned off, having regained his capacity to breathe spontaneously. Three years after 
the accident, at 53, they both find their lives intolerable. Neither wants to go on living.  
John, in response to this situation and the intolerable nature of his life, requests to have his ventilator 
withdrawn so that he can be allowed to die. Because John is competent, the doctors reluctantly accede 
to his request. Sam, by contrast, not being dependent on any life-sustaining treatment, requests a lethal 
injection. But the doctors refuse to accede to the request, because euthanasia is contrary to the law and 
public policy.  
The law and medical ethics, the authors contend, distinguish these cases by holding that, with 
euthanasia, if the doctors acceded to Sam’s request, they would be causing Sam’s death and so would 
be killing him. By contrast, in withdrawing the ventilator from John, the doctors are merely allowing 
John to die of his underlying condition, and so do not cause John’s death. It is merely an omission of 
treatment. This view, they say, ‘flies in the face of a candid look at the facts’.27 John, at the time of his 
request, has the potential to live for a decade or more, supported by mechanical ventilation. So what 
explains his death following withdrawal is not his spinal condition, but the act of turning off the 
ventilator. Indeed, if the ventilator were disconnected without his consent, that would be homicide. 
But how could it be homicide, unless the withdrawal caused death? The very same act of the doctor 
would be homicide if done without consent, yet ‘letting die’ if done with consent. But this would be 
absurd. Consent does indeed make the difference between homicide and legitimate treatment 
withdrawal, but that is an ethical or legal difference, and has nothing to do with the cause of the 
patient’s death, which is the same in both cases.28  
How, then, have traditional medical ethics and the law come to adopt such a false position? The 
prevailing view in medical ethics and the law, they say, involves a moral bias relating to causation.29 
We believe that it is morally acceptable to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, but we express this bias 
in the language of causation by stating that the medical practitioner does not cause death. The reason 
for this is that we believe that causing death is wrong.30 So it is the combination of our belief that we 
do no wrong in withdrawing LST, and our belief that causing death is wrong, that drives us to say that 
withdrawing LST does not cause death.31 Our moral bias in favour of the permissibility of withdrawal 
of LST skews our account of what is actually happening, and we consequently invent a fictional 
account of what is happening.32 A moral bias, they say, ‘is a motivated false belief about human 
conduct that serves a legitimating function’,33 here, the function of legitimating the practice of 
withdrawing LST and so causing death. In their paper with Dan Brock, they describe this motivated 
false belief as a fiction (which can take the form of either a moral or legal fiction):34 
                                                            
27 Ibid 456. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Miller and Truog, n 2, 13ff, 19ff. 
30 Ibid 3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid 19ff. 
33 Ibid. 
34 In the context of withholding LST, John Coggon has made a similar suggestion that the law’s position on 
causation involves a legal fiction: J Coggon, ‘On Acts, Omissions, and Responsibility’ (2008) 34(8) J Med 
Ethics 575. 
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Fictions are motivated false statements, endorsed in order to uphold a position felt to be 
important... [and] to uphold cherished or entrenched moral positions in the face of conduct 
that is in tension with these established moral positions.35 
By contrast, for ‘those critics who do not share the motivation – the commitment to the position in 
question – fictions appear to be patently false or confused’ (italics added).36 For Miller, Truog and 
Brock, then, the position on withdrawal is patently false.37  It ‘hides the fact that stopping these 
treatments causes the patient’s death and thus conflicts with conventional medical ethics’: 
Hence we conclude that it is a fiction to describe John’s death following withdrawal of the 
ventilator as merely allowing him to die and not causing his death.38 
In the rest of the paper, I will contest these claims. To rebut the moral bias point, it is only necessary 
to show that an alternative view to the one taken by the authors in respect of causation is reasonably 
open. For any view that is reasonably open, cannot be ‘patently false’.39 My aim, then, is to establish 
that it is at least reasonable to regard withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as allowing the patient 
to die from their underlying condition.  
B. Withdrawing LST, Causing Death, and the Act/Omission Distinction 
As noted, the authors regard the fact that John could live for decades as reinforcing their argument. In 
their book, they contend that in the case of ‘patients who can live indefinitely with continued LST, it 
is most patent that withdrawing LST causes death’.40 However, the length of time for which a patient 
can remain alive with LST does not, to my mind, have any relevance to the argument of causation. To 
see this, imagine, as a thought experiment,41 that John had written a valid advance directive dealing 
with this situation, which meant that doctors could not ventilate him. On the authors’ position, the 
doctors would have allowed him to die in honouring the directive, rather than causing his death.  This 
is because the authors concede that the clinicians in such a case do not, in standing by, cause death.42 
The authors accept that, in such a case, the patient dies from his underlying condition. That being so, 
it is clear that the length of time for which the patient can live has no relevance whatsoever to the 
causation question, and it is therefore wrong for the authors to claim that it is a relevant factor when 
considering if withdrawal causes death. The real issue is simply whether it is possible to say that, 
when treatment is withdrawn, we allow the patient to die from their underlying condition, rather than 
causing their death. This question has nothing to do with how long the individual concerned can 
survive when on LST. 
                                                            
35 Miller, Truog and Brock, n 2, 454. 
36 Ibid. 
37 On several occasions, they claim that this is either ‘obvious’ (Miller and Truog, n 2, 2) or that withdrawal 
‘patently causes the patient’s death’ (Miller and Truog, n 2, 4), that the opposing view is ‘patently contrary to 
the common-sense conception of causation’ (Miller and Truog, n 2, 9) and that it ‘seems all the more clear...that 
withdrawing LST causes death’ (Miller and Truog, n 2, 12). 
38 Miller, Truog and Brock, n 2, 456. 
39 See also note 37 – it is only necessary to show that the issue is not so clear as the authors maintain in the 
passages cited in that footnote. 
40 Miller and Truog, n 2, 5. 
41 In practice, it is unlikely ever to be possible not to institute the ventilation. It would be instituted first, and 
then withdrawn once the advance directive is sighted. But for the sake of argument, we need only imagine that it 
were possible to see the advance directive before institution of ventilation were necessary.  
42 Miller and Truog, n 2, 4. 
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Why, then, do the authors regard the case of withdrawal differently from the case of withholding? The 
authors claim that in withdrawal, by contrast with withholding, the agent ‘initiates the fatal sequence, 
as distinct from merely permitting it to continue without intervention to stop it’.43 This distinction 
between initiating a fatal sequence, and merely permitting it to continue, is the key to their argument.  
In a very significant passage, they anticipate the objection that since LST operates to arrest a natural 
process of dying from disease or injury that would otherwise proceed to death, stopping the ventilator 
merely allows the dying process to proceed44— a kind of resumption of the natural process after an 
interruption of it. To this objection, they respond that: 
if implementing LST... can arrest the natural process of dying – it causes that process to cease 
or slows its progression – then when it is stopped, the withdrawal sets in motion a new causal 
process (a fatal sequence) that leads to death.45 
This quotation brings us to the crux of the issue. Why must we regard the withdrawal of LST that was 
initiated, as the initiation of a new process, rather than as the resumption of a process that was stopped 
or suspended when the treatment was initially implemented? When driving, if I take my foot off the 
brake having slowed down, do I initiate a new causal process, or merely cease the process I initiated 
when I put my foot on the brake? Why do the authors insist that a new process is initiated rather than 
a process being allowed to resume, having been suspended for a while?46 Is it really a patently false 
fiction to look at the situation in the latter way? 
One argument they give in support of their view is that removing a barrier to a causal process is itself 
a cause of the outcome that ensues after the barrier is removed.47 But why do they find that analysis 
compelling? The answer, I think, turns on the traditional distinction between acts and omissions. For 
instance, in contrast to withdrawal, they say that ‘withholding mechanical ventilation from a patient 
who has refused it ... is an omission of treatment’.48 By contrast, the ‘act of turning off the 
ventilator....is a deliberate intervention to stop treatment’.49 They then make the following claim that 
makes their reliance on the act/omission distinction perspicuous: 
                                                            
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid 5. 
45 Ibid. 
46 It should be noted that the issue here concerns only the distinction the authors draw between allowing the 
resumption of a causal process that is already underway, and the initiation of a new causal process. It does not 
concern the different question of whether allowing a causal process that is underway to resume will itself have 
further causal consequences that would not have ensued if that process had not been allowed to resume. Thus, 
withdrawing LST when we do will mean that, once the patient has died, other consequences will now follow 
that would not have followed at that time had the treatment not been withdrawn. The administration of a will, 
for example, will now take place. But the same holds, of course, if we decide not to initiate treatment in the first 
place when initiating the treatment would have prolonged life, and thereby delayed the administration of a will. 
Not initiating the treatment will have the consequence that the will will be administered now rather than later. 
As I will argue below, it does not follow from the fact that decisions to withdraw LST affect the timing of death, 
that withdrawal of LST must be killing rather than letting die. If it did follow, then it would mean that the 
distinction between killing and letting die could not be drawn – all forms of letting die, to the extent that they 
could affect the timing of death, would necessarily be forms of killing on such a view. Thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer for comments prompting this clarification.   
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid 5-6. 
49 Ibid 5. 
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Stopping a ventilator is an active intervention into an ongoing process of sustaining a 
patient’s life by artificial respiration. Turning off the ventilator is no more an omission than is 
turning off a lamp by pushing a switch.50 
The basic point against classifying withdrawal as akin to withholding therefore stems from the fact 
that acts are involved in withdrawal. There is no standing by as in the case of omissions, for flipping 
the ventilator switch is like pushing a light switch, and so can hardly be classified as an omission.  
The arguments advanced by the authors have a familiar ring to them. Back in the 1970s, Ian Kennedy 
rejected the argument that turning off a ventilator was ‘an omission permitting death not a 
commission causing death’.51  Describing that argument as ‘clearly untenable’, Kennedy proposed a 
‘simple analogy’ with which to disprove it. Consider a tightrope walker balancing on a high wire far 
above the ground and without a safety net, so that a fall would be fatal. Anyone cutting the wire with 
the necessary intent and knowledge would be guilty of murder and ‘no amount of talk about only 
permitting the tightrope walker to fall will persuade otherwise’. A doctor turning off the ventilator, he 
wrote, is no different, and would be guilty of murder.52  
Like Kennedy, the authors adopt the strategy, as we have seen, of reaching for an analogy which 
would lead us to conclude that, if we accept the analysis of the analogy, we must accept the authors’ 
analysis of withdrawal of LST, hence their comparison of turning off a ventilator to ‘turning off a 
lamp by pushing a switch’, or to ‘turning off the ignition in a car’.53 Just as we would not regard 
turning off a lamp as an omission, so it would be absurd to regard turning off a ventilator as an 
omission.  These analogies are used to reject the claim ‘that there is ambiguity in whether 
withdrawing mechanical ventilation should be regarded as an act or an omission’:54 
We see no such ambiguity.55 
However, for every so-called ‘simple’ analogy that can be concocted which seems to lead to one 
conclusion, it is possible to think of others that seem to make us less certain.  
Discussing Kennedy’s example, for instance, Helen Beynon cites the example of the drip.56 The drip 
may sustain life in desperately ill patients who will never make any real recovery.57 But, as Beynon 
suggests, the crucial point is that the bags supplying the fluids empty themselves and need to be 
replaced. A decision to discontinue use of a drip may be put into effect either by withdrawing the tube 
from the patient’s body or by failing to replace an emptied bag of fluid when it is next due to be 
                                                            
50 Ibid 9. The authors claim that once the ventilator is stopped, ‘the clinicians stand by, thus allowing the patient 
to die’: Miller and Truog, n 2, 4. But, they insist, the act of withdrawing itself can hardly be classified in this 
way. There may, however, be a problem with analysing such cases by splitting the conduct up into discrete 
elements, an act followed by an omission. For instance, when I turn the air conditioning on to cool the room 
down, do I subsequently stand by and allow the room to cool down? On the author’s position, we would have to 
answer affirmatively. But this seems to obliterate the distinction between turning the heating off to allow the 
room to cool down, and turning the air-conditioning on to cool it down. I will not pursue these difficulties any 
further here. For detailed treatment of the relationship between allowing by means of acts, and letting die, see 
McGee, n 20. 
51 I Kennedy, ‘Switching off Life Support Machines: the Legal implications’ [1977] Criminal Law Review 443, 
452. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Miller and Truog, n 2, 10. 
54 Ibid 9. 
55 Ibid 9. 
56 H Beynon, ‘Doctors as Murderers’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 17, 20. 
57 Ibid. 
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replaced.58 The upshot, however, is that the clinician or other practitioner will have caused death in 
the first case (because it is an act), but not in the second (because it is an omission). Yet often it is a 
matter of pure chance which method of discontinuing the drip is chosen.59 Surely, she suggests, there 
is no meaningful difference between these two courses of conduct. As we shall see shortly, 
considerations of this nature led Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the seminal Bland60 case to claim that 
withdrawal of LST should be classified as an omission, that is, as allowing the patient to die, rather 
than causing death.  
It is noteworthy that the dominant example Miller and Truog use in illustration of their thesis is the 
withdrawal of ventilation. But they claim that the argument is even clearer in the case of withdrawal 
of ANH: 
It is more difficult to maintain that withdrawing LST does not cause the death of patients 
when artificial nutrition and hydration is the treatment that is withdrawn. In these situations, it 
is more of a stretch to appeal to the underlying condition as the cause of death; rather, the 
patient dies as a result of dehydration subsequent to the withdrawal....61 
It is with this passage, however, that some difficulties with the authors’ arguments emerge. First, it 
leaves the authors in a very awkward position because, as we have seen, they have conceded that 
withholding is an omission and does not cause death (assuming no duty to treat).62 On their view, if it 
becomes clear that a patient would need to have a naso-gastric tube inserted so as to be fed and 
hydrated, but the doctors decide that it would be appropriate to withhold these measures, the patient 
would die from his or her underlying condition. But the claim made in the passage just quoted 
undermines their position on withholding, for the same point made in the passage would apply equally 
to withholding as to withdrawal: the patient would die as a result of dehydration subsequent to the 
withholding of ANH (assuming the dehydration would impact first).  This represents a considerable 
problem for their position. 
Second, it is artificial to distinguish dying from the underlying condition, and dying from dehydration. 
For as soon as we ask why they died from dehydration we can say that their underlying condition 
prevents them from eating and drinking. For example, the condition of Anthony Bland – the football 
fan who fell into a permanent vegetative state following the Hillsborough disaster – clearly explains 
why he needed to be fed through a tube: he wasn’t able to swallow because of his underlying 
condition. True, we can distinguish between the underlying condition (PVS) and its many 
consequences, but the underlying condition and, in particular, how serious it is – whether it is life-
threatening or not, for example – cannot really be understood apart from those consequences. The 
underlying condition has to be understood for what it is independently of any technological 
intervention. It is only on such a basis that we can know, for example, whether the condition is life-
threatening or not (and so whether it requires LST). 
But the third, and perhaps most significant, difficulty in the passage is that it fails to deal with an 
important point made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Bland63 case. In comments echoing those of 
Helen Beynon, Lord Browne-Wilkinson pointed out that withdrawal should be considered a species of 
                                                            
58 Ibid 20-21. 
59 Ibid 20. 
60 Airedale National Health Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL). 
61 Miller and Truog, n 2, 7. 
62 The qualification about a duty is needed because the law considers that a failure to comply with a duty to treat 
explains why the patient dies and so in that sense, an omission can be causative. 
63 Airedale National Health Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL). 
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withholding, from this point forward, any further nutrition and hydration. We shouldn’t, he said, focus 
only on the fact that the tube is withdrawn, which is an act. For the tube could be left in place until 
after Anthony Bland had died, and the doctors could simply refrain from providing any further 
ANH.64 If the tube were left in place until after Anthony had died, the ‘act’ of removing it 
subsequently could not cause death.  
Indeed, we needn’t even go that far. We could refrain from providing the food and water first, and 
then withdraw the tube, even before Anthony died. Even here, the ‘withdrawal’ of the tube could not 
be a cause of Anthony’s death.65 Because the nutrition and hydration is provided only periodically 
and, in that sense, is not ongoing, it is even easier to regard the withdrawal as an omission, for one 
merely refrains from providing the nutrition and hydration the next time one would be due to provide 
it. Moreover, since refraining from providing the nutrition and hydration will normally precede the 
withdrawal of the tube, the so called ‘act’ of withdrawal will always be causally impotent – it won’t 
be a cause at all. It follows that withdrawal of ANH is an omission to provide further nutrition and 
hydration and, on the premise accepted by the authors that omissions to treat do not cause death, 
withdrawal of ANH does not cause death. This is a considerable problem for the authors, given their 
claim that their point is even stronger in the case of withdrawing ANH than it is in the case of 
withdrawal of ventilation.  
But what about the withdrawal of ventilation itself? The argument just given seems to be unavailable 
in cases where constant ventilation is needed because there is no equivalent way in which we can 
refrain from providing oxygen prior to flipping the switch. But in the spirit of Beynon’s point about 
the drip discussed above, it should be noted that this is not necessarily so. During ventilator or airway 
tubing changes, ‘bagging’ or manually ventilating a patient by means of a resuscitation device is 
undertaken.66 This involves directing oxygen to the patient by squeezing the bag, which automatically 
reinflates after each squeeze. If we are concerned that flipping the switch causes death then, as Don 
Buchanan notes,67 we can remove the ventilator from the breathing tube and connect the tube to the 
bag and manually squeeze the bag a number of times, before stopping. This would then make the 
cessation of ventilation like the cessation of ANH – refraining, from this point forward, to provide any 
more ventilation. It would, on this analysis, be equivalent to withholding ventilation which, as the 
authors have conceded, is an omission and therefore merely allows the patient to die. For the act of 
switching off a ventilator has been completely removed from the picture, and refraining from 
squeezing the bag again after it has reinflated is an omission – we do not squeeze the bag the next 
time we are due to squeeze it. 
Of course, it would be absurd for a practitioner to engage in what would be a tedious practice just to 
avoid liability, or to ease their conscience by ensuring their conduct is a clear omission.68 But this 
                                                            
64 Ibid 882. 
65 It is noteworthy that in fact the tube was left in place after tube feeding had been stopped. It was removed four 
days later, though before Anthony’s death. See J Howe, ‘The Persistent Vegetative State, Treatment Withdrawal 
and the Hillsborough Disaster: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland’ (2006) 6 Practical Neurology 238, 246. Thanks to 
Suzanne Ost for this information and for the reference to Howe’s paper. 
66 I am grateful to Don Buchanan, and to Sally Beattie, ‘Manual Ventilation’ (Modern Medicine, 1 December 
2004) <http://www.modernmedicine.com/modernmedicine/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=135255> accessed 5 July 
2012, for the points I am making about ‘bagging’. 
67 D Buchanan, ‘Old Law, New Medicine’ (unpublished).  
68 Analyses of this sort no doubt lead some philosophers to encourage us to forget about the act/omission 
distinction entirely, and focus instead simply on whether the conduct is justified morally or not. But the authors 
do not take this route.  
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absurdity is the very consideration that led Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Bland69 to say that withdrawal 
should be classified as an omission, so as to avoid the need otherwise to draw ‘intolerably fine 
distinctions’ of the kind just discussed. The point of raising the bagging example, and of raising the 
possibility discussed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson of leaving the feeding tube in place until after the 
patient has died, 70 is not to suggest that we should engage in these practices, but rather to cure us of 
the temptation to attribute too much significance to the fact that acts are involved, and so to stop us 
from agonising over whether we are, strictly speaking, killing these patients when we withdraw the 
measures (but not killing them if we withhold them in the first place). The bagging example, and the 
example of leaving a feeding tube in place and simply refraining from providing ANH the next time it 
is due, together show that, in substance, the fact that we can withdraw these forms of treatment by 
removing a tube or flipping a switch is irrelevant. In both cases, we are refraining to provide further 
treatment. 
It might seem that an important difference nonetheless still remains on this analysis between 
withdrawal of ANH and withdrawal of ventilation. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s point is that withdrawal 
of ANH is not causative because the doctors merely refrain from providing the ANH the next time it 
is due. Because the provision of ANH is not ongoing in the way that ventilation is, but is merely 
provided periodically, it is easier to regard its withdrawal as an omission – we simply refrain from 
providing it when it is next due (and only then withdraw the tube, thereby making the act causally 
impotent). A similar analysis would apply to the ‘withdrawal’ of dialysis. For the same reasons as 
those just given in the case of ANH, the fact that dialysis is given periodically means that there is no 
awkwardness involved in describing ‘withdrawal’ as an omission, because we simply miss the next 
turn.  
By contrast, in some cases of the provision of ventilation, the provision of oxygen is ongoing or 
constant. Should this make a difference? It is not obvious that it should. We are prone to think that it 
does make a difference only because we might need to flip a switch to discontinue the ventilation. But 
if we return instead to the bagging example, there does not appear to be a meaningful logical 
difference between discontinuing ventilation by refraining from squeezing the bag after the next 
reinflation, and refraining to provide ANH the next time it is due. Once again, then, our sense that 
ventilation is different seems to stem exclusively from the fact that we are thinking of cases where we 
flip a switch to turn the ventilator off. 71  Yet, for the reasons we have just seen, there is no meaningful 
difference between stopping ventilation by refraining from squeezing the bag after the next 
reinflation, and stopping ventilation by flipping a switch. 
It is noteworthy that, as Vardit Ravitsky points out,72 Israel has opted for a technical solution to the 
problem, whereby the provision of ventilation is made periodic and the ventilators are provided with 
built in timers. As Ravitsky notes, these measures might be regarded by some as dubious. However, 
our sense that they are dubious can cut in two different ways.73 We might take the strategy as 
                                                            
69 Airedale National Health Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL), 882. 
70 Though note, as discussed above, that leaving it in place is not necessary: we can simply refrain from 
providing the food the next time it is due and that would mean that removing the tube would be causally 
impotent.  
71 The fact that we must flip a switch, an act, does make it awkward to classify withdrawal of ventilation as an 
omission, but this is because acts and omissions are contrasting terms. It is less awkward to classify withdrawal 
of ventilation as letting die. For development of this point and discussion of the relationship between acting and 
allowing, see McGee n 20. 
72 V Ravitsky, ‘Timers on Ventilators’ (2005) 330 British Medical Journal 415. Thanks to Franklin Miller for 
this reference. 
73 As noted by Franklin Miller, personal communication. 
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effectively showing that withdrawal of our current unmodified ventilators cannot be analyzed in the 
same way as ANH and dialysis, and so as supporting the authors’ contention that withdrawal of 
ventilation at least (if not of ANH and dialysis) must be seen as causing death. Alternatively, we 
might consider the strategy to be unnecessary, on the basis of Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s remarks in 
Bland about the need to avoid such ‘intolerably fine distinctions’ and look, in substance, at what is 
being done in withdrawal, given that these measures have initially prolonged the patient’s life.  For 
the reasons given above, I don’t think there can be any doubt that the strategy is unnecessary. It is 
hard to see why a ventilator that can switch itself off can be meaningfully different from a ventilator 
that needs to be switched off manually.  
It follows from these considerations that the authors are wrong to base their argument that a new 
causal process is initiated on the fact that acts are involved. The considerations discussed by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson show that, even if acts are involved, they are causally impotent in many cases of 
withdrawal, such as the withdrawal of ANH and dialysis. And the bagging example seems to show 
that ventilation need not be regarded any differently either. These considerations have not been 
acknowledged by the authors, but I think they could be fatal for the position that they take. 
Nonetheless, the authors adopt a second argument that withdrawal of LST causes death. This 
argument does not rely on the act/omission distinction. They could therefore concede all these points, 
but still insist that withdrawal causes death on the following, alternative basis. It is to this possibility 
that I will now turn.  
C. Does the Power to Extend Life Bring with it the Power to Cause Death? 
At one point in their book, Miller and Truog claim that ‘the power of medicine to sustain life by 
means of technological interventions... goes hand in hand with the power to cause death when these 
treatments are withdrawn’.74 This point seems to me to stand independently of the authors’ reliance on 
the act/omission distinction. The point would be that, because we have now kept the patient alive by 
feeding them or ventilating them, stopping that, even if we accept that doing so is a simple refraining 
or omission, necessarily causes death. However, I do not find this argument compelling. To say that 
the power to extend life brings with it the power to end it does not, on its own, say enough: it doesn’t 
bring with it the power to give people a lethal injection, for example. What we can do is merely stop 
extending the lives of those patients whose lives we have been extending. Indeed, for this reason, their 
claim can be turned on its head – the power to ‘cause death’ when withdrawing technological 
interventions goes hand in hand with the power to extend or prolong life and so is balanced out by that 
power. Any power doctors now have to ‘cause death’ only exists because technology has been 
invented and is now being used to keep people alive who would otherwise die – without the 
technology to hold death at bay, the doctors would have no power to ‘end life’ at all under our current 
ethical and legal system. All we can do, then, is merely stop the ongoing life-prolonging treatment we 
have started in a particular case. 
It is, of course, true that, in providing LST, the patient will die at a different time than she would have 
died if the LST had not been provided (assuming the treatment is life prolonging, and so really does 
prolong her life). Similarly, it is true that, when we withdraw the LST, the patient will die at a 
different time than she would have died if we continued to provide it. We should therefore look at 
switching off the ventilator, withdrawing ANH, and withdrawing dialysis as causing, not death, but 
merely the timing of death.75 When discussing the withdrawal of ventilation, Miller and Truog focus 
                                                            
74 Miller and Truog, n 2, 20. 
75 The arguments in the following paragraphs develop a suggestion that I have made in  McGee n 20.  
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exclusively on the fact that, when a doctor withdraws a breathing tube or flips a switch, this will cause 
air to cease being blown into the lungs and the patient will die. This cannot be doubted, but it does not 
follow without more analysis that withdrawal causes the patient’s death rather than allowing the 
patient to die. The very fact that life is being prolonged in an ongoing way by the provision of 
ventilation up to the point of withdrawal, and that death is being held at bay, can make a conceptual 
difference to whether we classify what is being done as allowing the patient to die, or as killing her. 
The threat of death is only suspended or deferred rather than completely removed by the provision of 
ventilation because the possibility of spontaneous breathing is not being restored by it; it is merely 
holding at bay the fatal consequence that would otherwise follow from the patient’s inability to 
breathe spontaneously. By providing on-going life-prolonging treatment, we are preventing death only 
in the sense that we are staving it off or holding it at bay; we are not removing its threat completely by 
curing the patient. For this reason, the provision and cessation of LST can be regarded as controlling 
only the timing of death, rather than as causing death.   
But, it might be said, how can I cause the timing of death if I do not cause death? Surely the latter is a 
necessary condition of the former! It is, of course, true that, if I cause death, I cause the timing of 
death. But the converse does not necessarily hold. Given the contrast between causing death and 
allowing to die, I can cause the timing of death not merely by causing death, but also by allowing to 
die: I cause the timing of death by allowing the patient to die now rather than allowing her to die later 
or sooner.  
These points might be conceded, but it might be objected that the point that withdrawal of ventilation 
causes the timing of death still means that it makes a causal contribution to death and so still falls on 
the killing side of the killing/letting die distinction. At one point in their analysis, Miller and Truog 
suggest that ‘[s]topping the ventilator contributes causally to the occurrence of death’.76 This 
interpretation too should be rejected. The initiation of life-prolonging ventilation staves death off or 
defers it in an ongoing way. Because it is ongoing, its provision can be understood as one ongoing 
action of prolonging the patient’s life which we stop performing on withdrawal. Without the provision 
of that ventilation in the first place, conditions necessary and sufficient for death would already have 
been actualised and the patient would already have died (the treatment is only life-prolonging if the 
patient would otherwise have died). When we provide life-prolonging ventilation, we prevent the 
independently existing causal conditions from being sufficient to produce the patient’s death, but 
those conditions will then, of course, regain their causal sufficiency on withdrawal. True, once I have 
started ventilating my patient, my stopping the ventilation at a later time becomes one of the 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for death at that time. This fact is, of course, what makes 
Miller and Truog claim that withdrawal patently causes death. But I am only in a position to stop 
prolonging the patient’s life at that later time if I have intervened to save the patient at this earlier 
time now and am still saving them up to that later time. The initial and ongoing intervention into the 
existing causal chain that, but for my intervention, would already have resulted in the patient’s death, 
therefore cannot be ignored. For it cancels out the later sufficient condition that is my withdrawal; the 
sufficiency of the withdrawal for death later must be balanced with the loss of sufficiency for death 
earlier caused by the original and ongoing provision of the ventilation. It is this symmetry that allows 
us to see the withdrawal as the resumption of a causal process that was already underway and 
therefore as controlling merely the timing of death, rather than as the initiation of a new causal 
process and therefore as causing death.  Euthanasia does not have a similar symmetry. Patients who 
                                                            
76 Miller and Truog, n 2, 5. 
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request euthanasia are not having their lives extended by doctors, and that is the very reason why they 
consider it necessary to request euthanasia.77 
Withdrawal should therefore not be viewed in isolation, but should be seen in the context of the initial 
and ongoing provision of measures to defer death. As Jeff McMahan has expressed the point: 
Withdrawing one’s own previous aid or protection simply nullifies one’s initial intervention: 
the net effect is tantamount to non-intervention...78 
It should be seen as analogous to a ledger: putting $10,000 into a bank account, thereby providing a 
healthy balance for a while, and then withdrawing it, leaving a balance of $0, i.e., leaving us back 
where we started.79 Causing death would be like withdrawing the $10,000 without having put it in to 
begin with. 80  
This analysis is, at any rate, not a wholly irrational, or patently false, way of looking at the withdrawal 
of any form of ongoing LST. If the analysis is sound, it no longer seems plausible to say that the law’s 
position on withdrawal is ‘patently false’ or ‘flies in the face of a candid look at the facts’. To insist, 
as Miller and Truog do, that a new causal sequence is introduced rather than resumed and therefore 
withdrawal causes death, is to insist that ‘letting die’ must be restricted to non-intervention, and this 
becomes a linguistic recommendation on their part. But there is no more reason to accept it – or to 
believe that we are being irrational in rejecting it – than there is to insist that a referee can never 
resume a game of football but always starts a new game after he has blown the whistle for a foul. 
Returning to the authors’ example of Sam and John, although Miller, Truog and Brock are right to say 
that John dies when he does because the treatment is withdrawn, it is equally true to say that he dies 
when he does because his life has been prolonged – otherwise he would have died sooner. Both sides 
of the equation must be considered, as they balance one-another out. The law and traditional medical 
ethics looks at withdrawal in this way because, otherwise, doctors would nonsensically be 
                                                            
77 Consider this analogy: suppose my jumper has worn out to point of developing holes in it. I decide to repair 
the jumper by darning the holes so I can continue wearing it, thereby prolonging its life. After wearing it a few 
times, I decide to remove the darning so I can use the threads in another garment. Have I caused it to wear out 
by removing the darning? I don’t believe we would say that I have, and this is to do with what had already 
happened before the darning. It is not akin to the process by which modern ‘worn look’ jeans are produced for 
sale, for example. Similarly, the fact that a patient was already dying and would have died but for the provision 
of life-sustaining measures justifies our saying that we do not cause death on withdrawal but merely allow the 
underlying condition to take effect. For the provision of those measures does not remove the underlying problem 
and so does not remove the actual threat of death, but merely holds it at bay. 
78 J McMahan, ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid’ in B Steinbock and A Norcross (eds), Killing and 
Letting Die (Fordham University Press: NY, 2nd edn, 1994) 389. 
79 Though useful, the analogy is not exact because one important feature about prolonging life is that the 
prolongation is on-going, and merely holds death at bay rather than actually removing its threat entirely. See the 
next footnote. 
80 It might seem as though this analysis leads to the following absurdity: a killer could claim that shooting a 
victim is ‘balanced out’ by the victim’s having been born as a necessary condition of the killer’s being able to 
shoot her, and so the shooting is nullified by the prior existence of the victim, the killing being tantamount to 
‘nonintervention’. But this is not so. First, the killer is not stopping doing something he has been doing, such as 
extending life, but rather is shortening the victim’s life. By contrast, with LST we are sustaining, and continuing 
to sustain, the patient’s life up to the point where we stop doing so by withdrawal. We are literally responsible 
for the patient’s continued existence, which is why withdrawal should be regarded as ceasing to extend or 
prolong life. Second, the analysis only applies where the patient continues to remain dependent on our life-
saving actions, so that we are merely holding death at bay. It does not apply where a patient has been cured and 
the threat of death entirely removed. Once saving a person has been completed, then ending their life would be 
initiating a new causal sequence and so killing them.  
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discouraged from initiating life-extending treatment if they would only be exonerated for not starting 
it, but would then be regarded as killers if they started, but later stopped, the life-prolonging measures. 
D. Significance of these Points for the Moral Difference Between Withdrawal and 
Euthanasia or Request for Assistance in Dying. 
In summary, the law and traditional medical ethics recognizes a distinction between taking steps to 
shorten someone’s life where, without those steps being taken, the patient concerned would live on 
(Sam’s case), and taking steps to stop prolonging a patient’s life (John’s case).81 In the latter case, 
unlike the former, the patient’s life is being supported through the application of technology and so 
the patient’s life is being prolonged by medical intervention preventing the onset of death. The 
patient’s life in such cases is completely dependent on us, and this is the very reason why the patient 
need not request a lethal injection; they can request us simply to stop prolonging their life. But a 
person in Sam’s position cannot request us to stop prolonging his life, for we are simply not 
prolonging his life: that’s the very reason why a lethal injection is being requested.  
 
This difference explains why the ethical issues surrounding withdrawal differ from the ethical issues 
surrounding euthanasia. Consider again John, who is being provided with LST. Because John’s 
continued existence is dependent on us in this way, ethical responsibilities accompany the application 
of that technology that simply do not attend us in the case of Sam, who is not dependent on us or on 
the application of any technology for his continued existence.82 One of those responsibilities concerns 
the question of how long it remains appropriate to keep on providing the life-extending measures. For 
example, where life-extending measures are too burdensome, then doctors are under a duty to 
consider withholding or withdrawing them because, in an obvious sense, the doctors are the cause of 
that burden to the extent that the doctors are providing the burdensome measures. This question 
cannot arise in the case of Sam, for the doctors are simply not causing him to stay alive as they are in 
John’s case. These differences are overlooked by Miller and Truog, and it is their failure to take 
account of these differences that drives them to deny the difference between withdrawal and 
euthanasia.83  
In section II, I will consider some possible objections to my response to Miller, Truog and Brock. 
However, for now I hope to have provided enough argument to show that it is at least reasonable for 
the law and traditional medical ethics to regard withdrawal of LST as allowing the patient to die, 
rather than causing death and so as killing the patient. If my arguments are successful at least in 
showing that this is a reasonable position for the law and medical ethics to take, they undermine the 
authors’ claim that the law is morally biased and adopts statements which are ‘patently false’, forging 
                                                            
81 On several occasions, Miller and Truog speak of withdrawal as ‘hasten[ing] the occurrence of death’ (Miller 
and Truog, n 2, 14) or making it occur ‘much sooner than it otherwise would’ (Miller and Truog, n 2, 5). But 
these statements are ambiguous between shortening life and not prolonging life. Withdrawal should be 
understood in the context of the fact that life has been and is being prolonged. For more on this point, see 
McGee, n 16. 
82 Note that the emphasis here is on those measures that prolong life and whose withdrawal would therefore 
allow the patient to die. I am not claiming that those who request euthanasia are never actually being treated or 
being provided with any medication whatsoever. 
83 ‘...the ethical considerations that support withdrawing LST – respecting patient self-determination and 
promoting personal well-being by relieving suffering – also support active euthanasia....The bright line appears 
to be nothing more than an illusion produced by moral bias, driven by commitment to the established norm that 
doctors must not kill’: Miller and Truog, n 2, 27. To be sure, Miller and Truog recognise that there are ethical 
differences between withdrawal of LST and euthanasia (Miller and Truog, n 2, 30). But they are logically 
committed to regarding withdrawal of LST as a form of euthanasia in so far as they claim that withdrawal of 
LST causes death and so is a case of killing rather than letting die. 
Withdrawing LST: Causing Death or Allowing to Die? 
 
17 
 
out of these moral or legal fictions. For once it is accepted that the conduct could reasonably be 
classified as allowing the patient to die and so as non-causative, the moral and legal fiction argument 
loses its persuasiveness. That argument only seems to get purchase if there are stronger reasons for 
classifying the conduct as causative, as a species of killing which we find too unpalatable to face. Yet 
the above arguments show that, at the very least, withdrawal is a grey area.  
II POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS  
It is now necessary to turn to two possible objections to my account. The first concerns how this 
account deals with the challenge posed by the authors, namely, that if withdrawal does not cause 
death when undertaken lawfully, but is homicide when undertaken unlawfully, how could it be 
homicide if withdrawal does not cause death?  
The answer to this question may now be obvious. As we have seen, the reason the law regards lawful 
withdrawal as non-causative is that it regards the withdrawal as balanced out by the initial and 
ongoing provision of life-extending measures. In a sense, withholding is deferred by the initial 
provision of the measures, so that the doctor can reach a position from which he or she can better 
judge whether the provision of those measures is sufficiently worthwhile (or until a competent 
recipient, like John, decides that he has had enough). It is understandable, then, that the law would not 
regard an unauthorized withdrawal as balanced out by the initial provision because it is either 
undertaken by an interloper, or by a doctor in circumstances that make the conduct unlawful.84 To 
return to the ledger analogy, if the withdrawal is undertaken by an interloper, that would be equivalent 
to a thief hacking into your account and withdrawing your money. The same physical actions are 
performed by the thief as are performed by you, but those actions constitute theft. Unlike when you 
withdraw your money, the thief does not withdraw what you, or someone you have authorised such as 
your employer, have put into the account to begin with. Similarly, the interloper’s physical actions are 
the same as the doctor’s in withdrawing the treatment, but they constitute killing because they are not 
balanced out by the doctor’s own initial and ongoing provision of the life-prolonging measures; 
rather, the interloper’s actions constitute an active intervention in the regime of treatment being given 
by the doctor. In an obvious sense, the interloper does not stop doing what he has been doing, namely, 
prolonging life.85  
If, on the other hand, the conduct is undertaken by a doctor but the conduct is unlawful – for example, 
he or she acts against the consent of the patient – then that would be more akin to someone you have 
entrusted to deal with your financial affairs withdrawing and applying monies without your consent or 
as you have directed. Again, they may perform the same physical actions you do when withdrawing 
your money. But what they do is unlawful, and so would be characterized differently from what you 
do when performing exactly the same physical actions. Once again, then, conduct can amount to 
killing when done unlawfully, but merely letting die when done lawfully. The requisite symmetry that 
allows the law to regard the withdrawal as nullifying the initial provision, as McMahan put it in the 
passage cited above, is not present in these cases.  
The second objection concerns the extent to which this analysis can apply to other more difficult cases 
of life-prolonging treatment not so far considered. Could a person who has had a pacemaker fitted – 
and who has thereby had their life prolonged – request its removal? Surely, it might be said, such a 
case would be more like a request for assisted suicide or euthanasia. It is important to distinguish 
                                                            
84 Jeff McMahan, n 78, has suggested that the person performing the appropriate role makes a difference here.  
85 For more detailed discussion of this analogy and consideration of objections to it, see (reference follows blind 
review). 
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between refusals of the life-prolonging treatment (and withholdings based on that refusal) and 
requests for its withdrawal in this case. The analysis that applies to artificial ventilation/ANH, on the 
one hand, and the pacemaker, on the other, is identical in the case of refusal. This is because the 
patient can refuse any life-prolonging treatment, and the provision of a pacemaker is no less life-
prolonging treatment than the provision of ventilation/artificial nutrition. However, once the 
pacemaker has been provided, the situation changes and the case of the pacemaker differs from the 
case of artificial ventilation or nutrition because the provision of ventilation or nutrition is on-going 
treatment, to which a patient must continuously consent, or, more accurately, from which the patient 
can withdraw their consent at any time,86 whereas the provision of a pacemaker87 is not. Once the 
pacemaker is implanted, the doctor’s acts are complete. This remains so, even though the pacemaker 
itself, once implanted, continues to prolong the patient’s life. A patient can withdraw consent for the 
provision of life-prolonging treatment as long as the provision of the treatment is ongoing, for they 
would then be refusing to consent to any further on-going treatment. But, once the provision of the 
treatment has been completed, it is too late to withdraw consent. A request to have the pacemaker 
‘turned off’, in a case where it is actually prolonging life, is therefore a genuine borderline case 
between a request to be killed and a request to be allowed to die. On the one hand, it differs from the 
forms of life-prolonging treatment I have analysed so far. Unlike dialysis and ANH, its provision is 
not periodic (so we cannot just refrain from providing the treatment the next time it is due). And 
unlike ventilation, its provision is not ongoing; it cannot be seen as one continuing, and incomplete, 
act of prolonging someone’s life (from which consent can be withdrawn at any time). We therefore 
cannot regard it as a case of stopping treating,88 that is, as discontinuing doing something that you 
have been doing. Further, the burdens of living without the pacemaker are greater than those of living 
with it, unlike in the case of other forms of LST such as invasive ventilation.89 This means that it 
would be difficult to justify its withdrawal on account of its burdensomeness. On the other hand, it is 
akin to the other forms of life-prolonging treatment because it is, in the relevant cases, treatment that 
does prolong life. Further, although its provision is not ongoing, if it can be ‘turned off’ then doctors, 
and the individual who has had the pacemaker inserted, do retain some control over the pacemaker. 
Finally, since a pacemaker can be refused, it ought to follow that I should have the right to turn it off. 
All these considerations, to the extent that they point in conflicting directions, mean that requests for a 
pacemaker to be turned off are on the borderline between requests to be killed and requests to be 
allowed to die. There are arguments supporting both modes of classification, and it is unlikely that 
there will be a conclusive argument favouring one mode of classification over the other. It is, I 
believe, essential that we learn to be comfortable with the difficult or borderline cases that this and 
future forms of life-preserving technology might present, and regulate accordingly.90 
                                                            
86 I owe this point concerning consent to Professor Lindy Willmott, personal communication. 
87 Arguably, however, the fact that a pacemaker can be ‘turned off’ might mean that it should still be regarded as 
more akin to on-going LST. This need not be troubling: as with any distinction, there will always be cases that 
fall nearer the borderline where it is possible to view the situation in two different ways (see below). 
88 I use ‘treating’ rather than ‘treatment’ because the latter term is ambiguous between stopping treatment 
someone else is giving and stopping treatment you yourself are giving.  
89 I owe this point to Dr Peter Saul, ‘Death of a Cyborg’ Australasian Association of Bioethics and Health Law 
Conference, Sydney, 13 July 2013. 
90 For example, we do not impose duties to ‘turn off’ pacemakers on those medical practitioners who would be 
uncomfortable with doing so. For an attempt to grapple with the ethics of implantable devices generally, see 
Daniel P Salmusy, ‘Within You/Without You: Biotechnology, Ontology, and Ethics’ (2008) 23(1) Gen Intern 
Med 69. For an argument that an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator is a ‘halfway house’ between a form of 
treatment and part of the body requiring its own special rules, see R England, T England and J Coggon, ‘The 
ethical and legal implications of deactivating an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator in a patient with terminal 
cancer’ (2007) 33(9) J Med Ethics 538. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
The authors have not convincingly made out their claim that the traditional view in medical ethics and 
the law, that lawful withdrawal does not cause death, is ‘patently false’. They have not understood the 
sense in which the traditional ethical and legal position promulgates this claim, and accordingly have 
failed to establish that the law adopts legal fictions in order to legitimate what is, on its own terms, an 
unethical practice.  That being so, their calls for a reconstruction of the law and traditional medical 
ethics are premature, and clear ethical differences remain, contrary to their claims, between 
withdrawal and euthanasia. This may also have significant ramifications for some of their other claims 
in their book, concerning organ donation. One such claim is that we should not worry that retrieving 
organs might be causing the deaths of some donor patients, because we cause their deaths in any event 
by withdrawing LST. This argument would not, however, be available to them if withdrawal merely 
allows a patient to die, rather than causing their death. In such a case, organ procurement would 
actively be causing the deaths of these patients and would therefore amount to a significant step 
beyond what is currently allowed by the law in the case of withdrawal.  Whether, of course, this 
should continue to be permitted is not a question I have sought to address in this paper. 
